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REPLY TO KOPPELMAN:
ORIGINALISM AND THE (MERELY)
HUMAN CONSTITUTION
Steven D. Smith*
1

Andy Koppelman’s provocative diagnosis of originalism, of
Jack Balkin, and of disgust gets one thing right and several
things backwards. Or so it seems to me. I’ll start with the things
Koppelman gets backwards. Then I’ll say what I think
Koppelman gets right, and how he and Balkin make a
potentially valuable (albeit partly inadvertent) contribution not
only to originalism but to the ongoing experiment in democratic
self-governance.
I
Over the last several years, and to the surprise of some,
Professor Balkin has proclaimed himself an originalist. He has
advocated what he calls the “method of text and principle”—an
approach which, by interpreting the Constitution’s original
meaning to embrace a set of open-ended principles, is able to
justify pretty much any results that the most ardently progressive
2
constitutional heart could desire. Less expansive originalists
have sometimes expressed skepticism about Balkin’s ostensible
conversion, and on occasion they have vigorously criticized the
3
version of originalism that Balkin advocates.
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. This
comment was written by invitation as a reaction to Andy Koppelman’s essay called “Why
Jack Balkin is Disgusting.” I thank Larry Alexander and Michael Perry for helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1. Andrew Koppelman, Why Jack Balkin is Disgusting, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 177
(2010).
2. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 427 passim (2007) [hereinafter Constitutional Redemption]; Jack M.
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 passim (2007).
3. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its
Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 857, 879–80 (2009). For an incisive criticism
from a non-originalist perspective, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its
Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two about Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383 (2007).
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Koppelman thinks he perceives in this critical reaction a
feeling of “disgust,” and it is this perception that informs his
assessment of originalism. I confess that I am not perfectly clear
4
on exactly what the originalists’ ostensible feeling of disgust is
supposed to reveal. Sometimes Koppelman indicates that disgust
serves to police the boundary between the human and what
might be called the subhuman—to distinguish humans from
“animals and animal waste products.” (184–185). The larger
discussion suggests, however, that disgust reflects a revulsion
against the (merely) human—”our animal vulnerability and
mortality” (184)—arising out of a yearning for something that
transcends the human: “transcendent aspiration,” “transcendent
ideal,” and a “transcendent ideal of justice.” (180, 182). So the
overall argument, as I understand it, is that originalists feel
5
disgust toward Balkin because he has ostensibly demonstrated
what originalists are loathe to admit—namely, that the
Constitution “is a human construct” and that “[w]e are, perhaps,
all that the Constitution is constituted out of. Its innards are as
slimy as ours.” (187)
There is in this assessment a valid and valuable point, I
believe, which I will come to shortly. In general, though,
Koppelman’s diagnosis seems . . .well, pretty much upside down.
It is as if Koppelman has gotten his characters mixed up—he has
confused Macbeth with Macduff, so to speak—and thus has
ascribed to originalists the qualities and aspirations of their
critics, and vice versa.
After all, it has been critics of originalism, not the
originalists, who have most often betrayed a powerful yearning
6
for a higher-than-human or transcendent Constitution,
accompanied by a dissatisfaction—”disgust,” if you like—for the
4. Originalists with whom I am acquainted (and, speaking as a sort of “fellow
traveler,” I am acquainted with a fair number of them) often view Balkin’s position as
interesting, or curious, or misguided and unpersuasive, but I have not encountered
originalists who find either Balkin or his views “disgusting.” I take it, though, that
Koppelman is indulging in a bit of provocative ironic hyperbole to frame his thesis—a
thesis, it should be noted, that is plainly admiring toward Balkin’s work.
5. Koppelman suggests that the “Early Balkin”—the one associated with
deconstruction and postmodernism—accomplished this disenchantment discursively. The
“Later Balkin,” more subtle and oblique, has confirmed the deconstructive
demonstration performatively—by embracing originalism without relinquishing his
progressive commitments, and thereby acting out the collapse of originalism into its longtime nemesis, “living Constitutionalism.” Koppelman’s interpretation of Balkin has the
virtue—or is it a vice?—of giving a kind of (persistently) subversive and (recently)
deceptive unity to Balkin’s earlier and current work.
6. For a lengthier discussion of this tendency, see Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in
Constitutional Interpretation, 79 VA. L. REV. 583 (1993).
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merely human Constitution. Thus, we behold Ronald Dworkin
insisting that the Constitution and the law must be viewed as a
body of comprehensive and coherent moral principles, fully
7
accessible only to a demigod like Dworkin’s Hercules. Dworkin
disdains, as unworthy of our respect, a constitution understood
merely as the legal expression of a series of political decisions
8
and compromises. Or we observe Larry Sager, who regards the
9
Constitution as a perfect embodiment of justice. Or Robin
West, who views the Constitution not so much as a mundane
legal instrument as “a source of moral insight and a vision of the
10
just society”
To be sure, not all of those who reject originalism are given
to these exhilarating visions (or hallucinations?). Some favor a
humbler “common law Constitution” in which meanings evolve
historically along with changing values and commitments of the
11
political community. But as one might expect, this more
Burkean conception of the Constitution fits awkwardly with a
practice of an active and “progressive” judicial review. At some
point, it seems, the argument has to be (unless it deliberately
veers in an elitist direction) that nine elderly men and women
insulated inside a marble building in Washington are more in
tune with the current, living beliefs and commitments of “the
People” than elected legislators are—or perhaps than “the
People” themselves are? That wanton implausibility tends to
push progressive constitutionalists down the path of viewing the
Constitution as something more transcendent. The Constitution
12
becomes a sort of living deposit of more ethereal principles —
principles whose content surpasseth the understanding the mere
mortals who actually draft and vote for the words, and which
accordingly must in the fullness of time be articulated and

7. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176–266, 355–99 (1986).
8. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 74 (1996) (referring contemptuously
to those who, by viewing the Bill of Rights as a set of particular historical decisions,
would turn it into “a document with the texture and tone of an insurance policy or a
standard form of commercial lease”).
9. Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U.L. REV. 410 (1993).
10. ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 18, 261 (1994).
11. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). I have sometimes inclined to some such more gradualist and
tradition-oriented conception. Steven D. Smith, Separation as a Tradition, 18 J.L. & POL.
215 (2002).
12. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J.
453, 525 (1989) (describing Constitution as “a rich lode of principle”).
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refined (and, of course, forcibly imposed) by judges (counseled,
13
of course, by legal scholars).
In short, it is non-originalists who characteristically exhibit
contempt for the merely human Constitution. Conversely,
originalists make up the party that not only acknowledges but
indeed insists on the human character of the Constitution.
Originalists are diversely minded, to be sure; but insofar as
14
originalism has a central and animating normative purpose, that
purpose, it seems, is to empower people—actual human beings—
to debate and deliberate and then adopt constitutional
provisions with the confidence that these will mean and do
pretty much what the human beings who adopt them understand
15
and intend the provisions to mean and do. Some originalists
look to the “subjective” intentions of enactors as the source of
16
these meanings ; others view the official enactors as working to
craft a more “objective” law in accordance with conventional
linguistic meanings that the enactors are presumed to
17
understand and use. Either way, originalism treats the
Constitution and its meanings as a thoroughly human affair.
This is not to say that originalists cannot believe in
transcendent realities and truths. Some do, probably, and some
don’t. Some originalists surely believe that constitutional
13. In Ronald Dworkin’s “Law’s Empire,” judges famously serve as “princes,”
while legal philosophers (like Dworkin) assume the role of “seers and prophets.”
DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 407.
14. Some originalists disavow any normative purpose, and offer originalism as
simply a theory of meaning or interpretation. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Controlling
Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT.
191, 195 (2001). My own view, succinctly put, is that there cannot be any “the account” of
meaning (or of interpretation): there are various possible accounts, and whether a
particular account is persuasive and useful will depend on what sort of interpretive
enterprise we are engaged in, and why. By this view, originalism (or any other theory of
legal interpretation) cannot be divorced from its normative purposes and implications.
15. In this vein, Michael McConnell explains:
All power stems from the sovereign people, and the authority of the
Constitution comes from their act of sovereign will in creating it. It follows that
the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with their understanding.
This is the theoretical foundation of originalism. If the Constitution is
authoritative because the people of 1787 had an original right to establish a
government for themselves and their posterity, the words they wrote should be
interpreted--to the best of our ability--as they meant them.
Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1127, 1132 (1998) (citations omitted). For a good account, see KEITH
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 110–59 (1999).
16. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re
Speaking?”: Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
967 (2004).
17. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997).
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provisions are sometimes adopted on the basis of, or as a way of
implementing, notions of morality or justice that are not merely
human constructions: I am not sure whether originalism could be
an even remotely attractive approach—to our own Constitution
anyway—without some such assumption. Even so, originalism
insists (with some arguable lapses that I will note momentarily)
that what counts as law—as valid, enforceable law—is what
human beings enact, and that the meaning of that law is what
18
those human beings understood it to be.
So then why does Koppelman suppose that originalists
yearn for a transcendent Constitution, and that they would be
disgusted by someone who shows that the Constitution is of
merely human provenance (if that is what Balkin has shown)?
There is in fact some slight warrant for this assessment, I believe,
which I will mention in a moment, but it is not the warrant that
Koppelman has in mind. The feature of originalism that he
seems primarily concerned with is an ostensible claim of—or
perhaps a psychological need for?—determinacy. Originalists
are said to believe that their approach to interpretation “purges
adjudication of discretion” (179) and that it delivers “fixity and
determinacy.” (179) In ascribing this naive belief to originalists,
however, Koppelman fashions a straw person vulnerable to easy
pummeling.
It is true (though in my view unfortunate) that some
originalists describe original meaning as “objective.” But
“objective” does not equal “determinate”: there are lots of
things that are in some sense “objective” but that we do not
know with certainty, and that accordingly remain undetermined
(for us). Originalists also argue, sometimes, that unless
constitutional meaning is tied to “original meaning” or “framers’
intentions” or something of the sort, then constitutional texts
19
could be interpreted to mean just about anything : the argument
implies that originalism is more determinate than non-originalist

18. In theory, to be sure, originalism is compatible with the possibility that the
people might simply incorporate some general principle or ideal into positive law and
authorize future judges to enforce the principle or ideal in whatever way they come to
understand it. Progressive interpreters like Dworkin (and Balkin) seem inclined to
suppose that many provisions in the Constitution—especially the First and Fourteenth
Amendments—do just that. But in fact it seems unlikely that citizens and political actors
would readily choose to make such an open-ended (and irresponsible?) decision. Thus,
originalists are characteristically as resistant to such interpretations as non-originalists
(and a few progressive originalists, like Balkin) are enthusiastic.
19. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Of Living Trees and Dead Hands: The Interpretation
of Constitutions and Constitutional Rights, 22 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 227, 234 (2009).
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interpretation is. But originalism might be more constrained
than at least some of its hermeneutical rivals without promising
anything like “fixity and determinacy.” Maybe some originalists
make the strong claim of determinacy that Koppelman ascribes
to them, but I don’t know who they are; I do know that leading
originalists have frequently been explicit in disavowing that
20
claim.
In sum, Koppelman’s diagnosis seems for the most part
backwards, and maybe a little perverse. It indicts originalists for
a failing that is most characteristic of their opponents, and that in
fact originalism is calculated to expose and resist.
II
Even so, I think that Koppelman is right (even if not for the
reasons he gives) to suggest that originalists sometimes follow
non-originalists in succumbing to what we might call the
“transcendental temptation”—to the urge to view the
21
Constitution as more than human. In doing this they depart
from their core commitments—like Christians who retaliate, or
rational choice theorists who unreflectively perform selfless acts
of kindness. Still, the departure is common enough. And
Koppelman is right to perceive that Balkin’s conversion to
originalism, whether sincere or (as Koppelman seems to imply)
strategic, serves to underscore this common failing, and thereby
to raise a serious challenge to the viability of the originalist
enterprise.
More specifically, in recent years, many professing
originalists have stressed that constitutional interpretation
should seek to ascertain and follow the “principles” supposedly
contained in constitutional provisions, not the “expected
22
applications” of the provisions’ enactors. It is understandable
20. See, e.g., id. at 235; see also Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 523 (2003) (“People certainly should not embrace
originalism in the false belief that it will provide determinate answers to all questions of
constitutional interpretation: neither originalism nor any other plausible approach to the
Constitution can do so.”).
21. Actually, originalists may go transcendental in more than one way. In my view,
originalists who have recently argued for an almost Platonic original meaning that need
not correspond to the understandings of either the “enactors” or the “public”—the fleshand-blood human beings who lived at the time a provision was enacted—have departed
from originalism’s healthy insistence on viewing law and meaning as human. But this is a
rarified heresy which need not be discussed here.
22. See, e.g., Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Original Meaning of
Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569 (1998); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
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that originalists would emphasize interpretation in accordance
with constitutional “principles.” For one thing, a constitution
understood as an embodiment of principles may seem more
worthy of respect. In addition, originalists are sometimes drawn
to the “principled” approach as a way of justifying decisions—
mainly Brown v. Board of Education—that seem beyond
criticism but that are difficult to explain on originalist
assumptions: Robert Bork’s defense of Brown is a notable
23
instance. Originalists also turn to principle to deflect the
familiar “dead hand of the past” objection. If originalism entails
following the particular notions and conceptions of men who
have been dead for centuries, that is, the approach may indeed
seem intolerably reactionary. But if originalism means following
the “principles” adopted in the past—principles that presumably
may be or must be adapted to present circumstances—the
24
approach seems less musty. Or at least so goes the argument.
Beyond such tactical considerations, it seems that originalist
interpreters must of necessity view constitutional provisions as
expressing principles, or at least general categories of some sort,
if the provisions are to have any current and useable meaning at
all. Imagine an interpretive approach that tried to eschew
“principles” and categories in favor of some sort of radical
nominalism in which words are understood to refer not to
universals or real categories, but only to the particular items or
instances contemplated by the person uttering the words. Thus,
when I say “red” I am not referring to any general quality or
property; rather, I am simply using the term as a shorthand to
describe a number of particular instances that I find it
convenient to group together—my niece’s hair, the apple I am
munching on at the moment, the sunset I saw yesterday evening,
and so forth (possibly including the color my face will turn when
I try to defend this ill-conceived nominalistic notion against any
moderately intelligent interlocutor). On this assumption,
constitutional interpretation would be impossible. The term
AMERICA 162–63 (1990). I have elsewhere argued that the distinction between
“principles” and “expected applications,” if not illusory, is at least overdrawn and often
misleading. Steven D. Smith, That Old Time Originalism 11 (Univ. San Diego Sch. Law,
Research
Paper
No.
08-028,
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1150447.
23. Bork, supra note 22, at 82.
24. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren
Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 249–50 (1991) (arguing that “originalism
presents no question of rule by the ‘dead hand of the past’” because “[o]riginalists
properly seek in the historical materials an intelligible principle capable of guiding
contemporary decision”).
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“cruel” in the Eighth Amendment would refer to a particular set
of punishments that the framers happened to disfavor.
(Beheading? The rack? But don’t even these terms refer to
categories of punishments?) The term “persons” in the Equal
Protection Clause would encompass those human beings known
to the enactors of the clause; once those persons passed beyond
this mortal vale, the term would have no further application, and
hence would effectively expire.
This sort of radical nominalism would make originalist
constitutionalism (and probably law itself, and maybe
communication generally) impossible. So it seems that
originalists have no choice but to treat constitutional provisions
25
as expressions of general categories of some sort. Often, it
seems, those categories are conceived of in terms of “principles.”
But this apparently inevitable resort to something like
principles also presents serious problems. Only one of those
26
problems need be mentioned here : understanding
constitutional provisions as embodiments of principles opens up
originalism to precisely the sort of open-ended, licentious
interpretations (licentious at least from the perspective of more
staid originalists) that Balkin offers. After all, many and perhaps
most originalists have long advocated, basically, the “method of
text and principle”: Balkin, arguably, is simply a more prodigal
practitioner of that method. He is, one might say, Borkexplaining-Brown ratcheted up a level or two. No doubt Balkin
has taken originalist methods in directions that many originalists
do not want to go. But in what sense are his general methods, as
opposed to his particular conclusions, so different from what
many other originalists commend?
More constrained originalists might of course quarrel with
Balkin’s specific arguments and conclusions. They might argue
that he has extracted the wrong principle from some
constitutional text, or that he has misunderstood or misapplied
that principle in reaching some particular conclusion. Once the
disagreements shape up in this way, though, it seems that Balkin
has won. The difference between originalism and “living
Constitutionalism” has vanished, and all parties are playing the

25. Cf. Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 703, 711 (2009) (“By necessity, legislators, and
certainly constitution-makers, deal in categories.”).
26. For discussion of other problems, see Smith, supra note 22 at 20–22.
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sort of game that Balkin and Dworkin and company want to
play.
For academics, there may be nothing to lament in this
development. Originalism achieves a kind of academic
respectability, and originalists and non-originalists can join
together to debate a host of interesting questions, both historical
and theoretical. What is the best account of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause? What is the most
philosophically adequate way to conceive of the “meanings” that
interpreters seek to discover or construct? Alas, what gets lost or
forgotten is merely . . . the practical normative purpose that
animated originalism in the first place—namely, the purpose of
permitting the People (meaning the actual human beings who
write constitutional provisions and read them and argue about
them and ultimately vote for or against them) to make and
entrench political decisions with the assurance that those
entrenched decisions will mean and do essentially what the
People understand and intend them to mean and do. Thus,
originalists who resort too readily to “principle” have as a
practical matter abandoned the project that was their reason for
being in the first place. They thereby validate Lon Fuller’s
observation that “[n]o one more than [the legal philosopher]
runs the risk of forgetting what he is trying to do. In no field
more than his is the thinker likely to be lured from his goal into
bypaths of his own thought or fall a victim to his own metaphors
27
and abstractions.”
So then, is Koppelman right after all, despite his topsy-turvy
ascription of roles and attitudes? Are originalists in the end, and
despite their contrary pretensions, beguiled by the temptation of
a transcendent Constitution? And has Balkin succeeded in
showing that originalism is not viable as an approach that is truly
distinct from the methods used by proponents of the “living
Constitution”?
Not necessarily. But the prospects for a viable and
distinctive originalism depend, I think, on resistance to the easy
move to “principle,” and on retention of something more like a
notion of commonsensical and conventional categories.
In this vein, a faithfully originalist approach to free exercise
or equal protection or cruel and unusual punishment would not
primarily try to extract some principle from the relevant

27. LON FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 2 (1940).
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constitutional provision and then use that principle as the point
of departure for elaborating a constitutional doctrine and
jurisprudence largely insulated (by the principle) from what the
human beings who enacted the provision thought it meant. The
approach would not treat “expected applications” and
“meaning” as identical, exactly; it would recognize that
constitutional provisions necessarily refer to categories, not just
to lists of particular instances that the enactors had in mind. But
a genuinely originalist approach would insist that the pertinent
question is not “What does the category cover, really?” or “What
does the principle actually entail?” The question, rather, is
“What did the category (or the principle) mean to them?”—
namely, to the people or the generation who adopted the
provision.
III
So, is this sort of admirably unambitious, resolutely
unprincipled originalism actually possible? It seems to be
available as a matter of commonsense practice. Justice Scalia
employs it, I think, when even in the face of disdainful criticism
from both non-originalists and professing originalists, he
maintains that the Eighth Amendment cannot be interpreted to
prohibit capital punishment because the enactors plainly
authorized such punishment. Similarly, even without (or
especially without) any overall theory of what the Fourteenth
Amendment was originally intended or understood to do, the
academically unadulterated will know to be wary when a scholar
asserts that the amendment, interpreted according to its original
meaning, “protect[s] homosexuals from discrimination even if
nobody knew there were such things as homosexuals in 1868, or,
if they knew what homosexuals were, would have opposed the
28
They will
extension of the principle to that social group.”
perceive this assertion as, most likely, the product of a piece of
(perhaps artful, perhaps sincere, perhaps well-intended)
academic sophistry.
But can this unsophistical and unsophisticated approach
survive without—or, more to the point, can it survive in the face
of—theoretical examination and elaboration? I’m honestly not
sure. In recent years, originalism has become a highly theoretical
29
enterprise. I have elsewhere expressed doubts—doubts, not
28. Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 488.
29. The outstanding manifestation is surely Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic
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confident judgments—about the value of some of this
30
theorizing. But I also suspect that originalism would benefit if
more of the theoretical acumen were directed not so much
toward elaborating and widening the gulf between
“intentionalist” and “public” (or between “subjective” and
“objective”) accounts of meaning but instead toward explaining
the workings of what we might call conventional categories. How
is it that enactors of a legal provision can adopt or incorporate
categories that are not simply lists of particular instances without
those categories assuming some sort of Platonic status (or, worse
yet, merely verbal status), thereby becoming unmoored from the
conscious, concrete intentions and understandings of the people
31
who chose to approve them? How, in short, can we keep the
Constitution a merely human document?
I have suggested that the animating purpose of originalism
is to permit “the People” to adopt constitutional provisions with
the confidence that these provisions will mean basically what the
People understand them to mean, and will have basically the
implications and consequences that the People intend the
provisions to have. In a political community with democratic
commitments or pretensions, that seems a worthy purpose. But
the enterprise does seem to depend on something like the
possibility of conventional or merely human (as opposed to
either “real,” in the philosophical sense, or merely verbal)
categories. If, in attempting to explain why Balkin is not a
faithful originalist, theorists are prompted to focus on and
develop that possibility, then Balkin (assisted by Koppelman)
will have done originalism—and, more generally, the on-going
project of democratic self-governance—a valuable service.

Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244.
30. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 22.
31. For at least the beginnings of an effort in this direction, see Larry Alexander &
Emily Sherwin, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 160–62 (2008).

